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In this essay I explore a possibility of experiential synthesis of the medicalized abnormal body 
with its aesthetic images. A personal narrative about meeting extreme abnormality serves as 
an introduction into theorizing aesthetic abnormality. The essay builds its argument on the 
phenomenological grounds; I therefore approach corporeality with Edmund Husserl and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty.  In turn, Max Ernst introduces an aesthetic frame for the subsequent 
examination of uncanny surreality.  Two exemplars of the surreal body, Joel Witkin’s “Satiro” and 
Don DeLillo’s “Body Artist,” intend to substantiate the preceding theoretic. The study shows how 
the encounter with the abnormal embodiment may suspend normalized modes of constitution to 
provoke uncanny experiences.
In this essay I investigate the possibility of approaching the abnormal 
body as an experiential manifold. Speciﬁcally, I argue that under certain 
conditions, such as an aesthetic encounter, the experience of the embodied 
abnormality is given as a syncretism of several modes of givenness which 
produce a multilayered engagement with the sphere other than real. For a 
phenomenological grounding of abnormality, I call on Edmund Husserl. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty enriches the Husserlian insights with his phenom-
enology of intercorporeality. Dialogically positioned, Husserl and Mer-
leau-Ponty help us understand how the abnormal other could be revealed 
beyond either representational aestheta or body-in-empathy to appear as an 
estranged but productive fusion of art and body in the sphere of its own, the 
uncanny. I thematize the uncanny with the surreal art of Max Ernst. The 
phenomenologically motivated argument opens with a personal experience 
of the abnormal body and its aesthetic context, which serves as the guiding 
clue for the subsequent analysis. In order to extend the analysis past the 
personal experience, I conclude with two exemplars from the artistic realm. 
The works of Joel-Peter Witkin and Don DeLillo diversify the structure of 
the uncanny abnormality with two extra modalities: symbolic ﬁguration, 
and narrative ir-reality.  I begin with the experience that begot this essay, a 
personal encounter with the abnormal body.
The encounter occurred in the Kunsthalle in Düsseldorf at the “Sur-
realismus” Art Exhibit in August of 2005. The actual meeting took place in 
the Max Ernst section of the exhibit. It is there that I saw a person whose 
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appearance broke any and every anticipation of an embodied human be-
ing. The person “stood” next to Ernst’s painting “The Teetering Woman.” 
The person’s face, haircut, and clothes indicated the female gender.  I could 
guess her age as being about forty years old.  Sunk deeply into the electrical 
chair, the woman was holding an audio-guide in her toes, bending toward 
it for better hearing. She had no arms and used her naked feet to adjust her 
child-like body to change the ﬁeld of vision. Judging by the apparent ease 
with which she moved herself in the chair and, simultaneously, moved the 
chair, her comportment was unreﬂectively habitual to her; no noticeable 
disjunction of motility could be detected. After the guided message ended, 
the woman put the recorder in her lap, and, with the help of her feet, pulled 
herself up. Then, the short stub of her right shoulder touched the control 
lever and rolled the chair to the next painting. As she moved further away, I 
heard someone behind me whisper, “Contergan.” I inquired. The results of 
that inquiry were various medical, social, and psychological consequences 
of the condition known as Contergan.  Brieﬂy, Contergan is a speciﬁc con-
dition caused by the drug “Contergan” that contains the active substance 
Figure 1. Contergan Hypnotikum          
Thalidomid (see Figure1).
Thalidomid was iso-
lated in 1956 by German 
chemist Heinrich Mueckler 
and commercialized the 
same year by the German 
pharmaceutical giant Gru-
enthal AG as Contergan, 
a tranquilizer and sleeping 
aid. Owing to its presumed 
safety and eﬀectiveness, the drug became especially popular with pregnant 
women.  However, having been inadequately tested, Contergan proved to 
be faulty, causing severe side-eﬀects. In its fetus aﬀective capacity, Contergan 
seems to be potent only during the ﬁrst trimester. Between 1958 and 1961, 
about ten thousand deformed children were born to the drug using preg-
nant mothers, mostly in Germany but also in the Netherlands, Denmark, 
and Sweden.  All the drug-induced deformities concern upper and lower 
extremities, spinal column, and knee joints, resulting in the condition com-
monly known as dwarﬁsm (see Figure 2). Mental capacities of the Contergan 
patients remained largely unaﬀected. There had been very few post-natal de-
generative eﬀects as well. Except for the treatment of the spinal cord in most 
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Figure 2. Contergan Baby
severe cases, no inpatient medical 
aid had been required for the 
Contergan population, only gen-
eral, albeit involved, home care.1 
Those medical specialists who 
came to research Contergan in the 
wake of this social drama noticed 
that Contergan’s abnormality did 
not connote debilitation but has 
a productive, generative facet; it 
turned out that they are extremely adaptable to their environment, treat-
ing with extraordinary ease those technological implements that had been 
abundantly designed to assist them.2 By the same token, the Contergan 
people exhibited unusually strong artistic inclinations, often tending to 
extreme forms of abstraction. In the next section, I would like to reﬂect 
on the experience of meeting the Contergan person, for it is the lingering 
unease of that experience that alerted me to its complexity and, at the same 
time, signiﬁcance. I begin with the general considerations as they refer to the 
abnormal body. On the basis of those, I argue for the relationship between 
aesthetics and corporeality, and, more speciﬁcally, between art in extremis 
and the abnormal body. I end by locating both in the uncanny sphere. 
The Abnormal Body
From the perspective of the normal body, a Contergan body is abnormal 
and therefore disabled. The mundane attitude allows for a range of accept-
able forms of abnormalities, some of which are symbolically socialized into 
familiar types. That is how a person in the wheelchair or a person with a 
cane, or an armless person would have been experienced. Often, these types 
of abnormal bodies are given with their corresponding contexts that im-
mediately connect us inferentially to the cause of their abnormality, be it a 
tragic accident, a natural disaster, or simply and, most inconspicuously, age. 
Yet, with the artistic exhibit forming the aesthetic horizon for my perception, 
other factors notwithstanding, the experience of the Contergan person’s 
dysfunctional abnormality arrived defamiliarized by other concurrent ex-
periences. These other experiences prevented me from both simply stating 
the fact of abnormality but also connecting the abnormal body to the lived 
body of mine in an act of empathetic congruence. It did manage, however, 
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to awaken the sense of wonder, the very awe that arises from encountering 
something, someone so odd that no available pre-formed measure is capable 
of giving the encounter any sensible explanation.  
The Contergan body was out-worldly. It belonged to a place of which 
I had no conception, could never visit, never apprehend. This inaccessible 
homefulness of the other prevented me from assuming a superior position of 
the normal person, cut short a build-up of empathy, but also precluded blunt 
objectivization.3 The Contergan woman was wondrous. Moreover, there was 
extreme art about her body. And, importantly, her abnormality did not come 
with or at a distance but pulled myself to itself, as only utter vulnerability 
could pull. At the same time, this surge of responsibility was frustrated at 
the very moment of recognizing the other body, for the Contergan person 
was absolutely inaccessible to me, and so the call could ﬁnd no outlet in an 
empathetic connection. The absolute and uplifted strangeness of the Con-
tergan person compromised the horizontal reach of empathy, preventing 
me from taking empathy for the foundational structure of apprehending 
“the sick, diseased, and other abnormal subjects” as liminal subjects, that 
is, on the threshold of ethics and aesthetics.4 More was demanded of me. 
But, given the limitations of my own ﬂesh, I could neither abandon my 
own embodied being, nor enﬂesh the other body by mine, for as Husserl 
intimated, my animate organism “holds me wholly”.5 And so, amidst all this 
experiential complexity, if not confusion, I must begin my analysis at the 
point of the greatest inﬂection, by asking, How can abnormality of the body 
can be available to us most generally?  
One can proceed answering these questions in a variety of philosophical 
tonalities: with Kant and the horriﬁc sublime, thus emphasizing the transi-
tion from the speculative and manifest (passive) comprehension of monstros-
ity to the practical moral action as in rejecting the abnormal on the grounds 
of its abnormality; with Freud and the drive to transform traumatic experi-
ences into aesthetic manifestations; or with Kristeva and the subconscious 
abject that passes over any comprehension, a true mania of the ungatherable 
other. Each of these tonalities is worth exploring in itself; yet, none of these 
perspectives echoes the straightforward simplicity of the experienced awe. 
My experience was bereft of the other as some sublimated evil monstrosity, 
a disgusting creature of my nocturnal life; on the other hand, no call of the 
other moved me to an ethical response to the strangeness of the encounter.6 
To me, the Contergan person appeared as neither threatening, nor repulsive, 
nor objectionable. As I have already stated, she appeared wondrous. At the 
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same time, having come from the other side of manifestation, wonder did 
not linger: after my awe receded, what remained in its most immediate ap-
pearance was abnormality itself. This prompts me to set my investigation 
in the traditional phenomenological register, with Merleau-Ponty’s analysis 
of the abnormal perception. Importantly, for Merleau-Ponty, the ownership 
of the abnormal perception is reversible; this conviction gives the analyst an 
opportunity to touch upon a wholly otherwise experience.7
In his Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty demonstrated that 
normally we constitute the world synesthetically, by and through gratuitous 
acts of self-centered intentionality. In other words, we rely on a unity of senses 
that, inseparably from each other, form a whole for our encounter with the 
whole of the external world, an alterity. Taken as a stage for apprehending 
this world, normality presents abnormality as a break in the unity of the 
sensorial input, in general, but more importantly, between the abstract and 
the concrete apprehensions. In introducing the distinction between the 
abstract and the concrete, Merleau-Ponty alters the Husserlian distinction 
between the active and the passive way of perceiving. Merleau-Ponty prefers 
the distinction between the abstract/reﬂective and the concrete/unreﬂective. 
The distinction is grounded in the function of the perceived background. 
Merleau-Ponty (1962) writes, “The abstract movement carves out within 
that plenum of the world in which concrete movement took place a zone of 
reﬂection and subjectivity; it superimposes upon a physical space a virtual 
or human space” (p. 111).  
In other words, the normal modality possibilizes abstract movements 
through projection, ﬁlling the open space with what does not naturally exist 
by making it take semblance of existence. The ﬁllings are words, gestures, 
and motions, all that which signify a human being capable of connecting to 
the world beyond its actual presence.8 From this perspective, the abnormal 
body appears to be ill-disposed of projecting meaning on what Merleau-
Ponty calls “free” space; it dislocates, mangles this space. Using his favorite 
example for ab-normal perception, Mr. Schneider, Merleau-Ponty (1962) 
elaborates, “Schneider’s abstract movements lost their melodic ﬂow. Placed 
next to each other, like fragments, end to end, they often run oﬀ the rails on 
the way” (p. 116). In other words, in the abnormal perception, the immediate 
synthesis is replaced by the interrupted stop-and-go activity predicated on 
the linear relationship between various senses. The abnormal perception is 
no longer at ease with the once familiar world; it constantly battles against 
its own failing memory. 
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From this account, I can interpret my experience of the Contergan’s 
body as a rupture in the constitution of her free space. However, if I at-
tend to her body as an origin of this rupture, I will inevitably fall into the 
mundane mode of appropriating the abnormal other vis-à-vis my normal 
constitutive self. In that regard, I will be taking the Contergan person as an 
assimilable aberration, a human freak performing the spectacle of abnor-
mality for my voyeuristic gaze. I will be able to understand her presence as 
an exemption from the normal world, its expectations and anticipations. 
Or, from a similar perspective, I can perceive her body as a disabled sick 
body, a reminder of human frailty and mortality. However, as I pointed out 
earlier, the Contergan body’s abnormality did not indicate either a social 
deviance or a medical dysfunction. To me, she was simply, or as the follow-
ing analysis intends to demonstrate, not so simply, wondrous: odd and, at 
the same time, inassimilable.  
What does this mean, inassimilable, odd?  What recourse does this deﬁnition 
have to our mundane experience?  In order to answer these questions we need 
to shift our focus, for Merleau-Ponty’s medicalization of ab-normality clearly 
requires a modiﬁcation. Based solely on the Schneider’s case, Merleau-Ponty’s 
descriptions posit the abnormal as an actual breach of normality (Schneider 
was a war veteran whose speciﬁc perception of the world resulted from a 
wound in the head). In contrast, the Contergan person’s abnormality is an 
inborn condition, something that precludes the self or other comparative 
analysis. Simultaneously, we need to switch from the abnormal perception 
to the perception of the abnormal, as its only through my perception of the 
Contergan woman that I came to know her. Although mutually implicated, 
abnormality as the perceived and the perceiving abnormality do not coincide 
already because I cannot possibly access the other’s abnormal perception. 
It will be counter to the phenomenological explication not only to suggest 
that I can assume the other’s experience, but also that I can perceive them 
in the same way as myself. I can typify my experience as to the other, but 
never access it, not even partially. This requisite becomes prohibitive in the 
case of the Contergan’s body, whose radically diﬀerent experiences I cannot 
even surmise.  
Since Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ab-normality stems from Husserl’s 
analysis of the aesthetic body, we might beneﬁt from visiting Ideas II, where 
Husserl addresses both the issue of the body and its ways of constituting 
the world and the other.9 In contrast to Merleau-Ponty, in his analysis, 
Husserl situates abnormality within the normal experience. Although his 
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notion of abnormality is devoid of the radical breaks in the perception of 
the world, his formulaic might be beneﬁcial to our purposes. Its thrust is 
as follows: when an unfamiliar experience arises from its own anomaly, the 
body overcomes the anomalous by normalizing it, making it an optimality, 
even if temporarily. When the world challenges the body’s normal way of 
proceeding with its Being-in-the-world, the body engages the same mode; 
it will seek to familiarize foreign experiences by making them optimal for 
the future encounter with them. As a result, Husserl’s analysis shows that 
the structure of normality presupposes the encounter with the abnormal as 
an everyday occurrence. 
In line with this reasoning, Husserl distinguishes between assimilable 
and inassimilable experiences. Assimilable abnormality is what can and 
becomes optimal for our perception. For example, a crutch creates an opti-
mality within the body’s abnormal motions. In comparison, the experiences 
impossible to incorporate are called “alien.” Such experiences include ani-
mal experiences (unattainable by deﬁnition), madness (an experience that 
cannot reﬂect on itself ), childhood experiences (these become lost in the 
secondary repetitiveness of adulthood), and the experience of the cultural 
Alien.  The animal case aside, only the cultural Alien falls into the category 
of the genuine alien, the alien that is given in the paradoxical mode of ac-
cessibility in the mode of original inaccessibility, according to Husserl. It is 
the intergenerational historical mode of constitution that makes the cultural 
Alien completely inaccessible. The Contergan body stands as the alien for 
two reasons: because, although accessible as a body, it is inaccessible in its 
very abnormality and because its speciﬁc abnormality is a group abnormality. 
Unlike the sick body getting better, that is granting access to itself through 
association or empathy, the alien body throws a radical challenge to the 
intersubjectively normal ways of constitution by constituting itself in and 
through a history of its own unique species.10  
At this point, I would like to oﬀer a more detailed description of the 
Contergan body as belonging to a species of its own. Since the normal 
body is given as a spatially situated body but also a body moving itself and 
reaching outside of itself, I will focus only on three aspects of the Conter-
gun abnormal motility: bodily spatial orientation, distance motions, and 
body proxemics.  The three aspects are intricately interconnected and most 
clearly seem to depend on the function of the upper and lower extremities. 
The upper extremities travel the body in space, constituting it at large and 
in relation to other moving objects and persons; the lower extremities, on 
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the other hand, make the body at home in a place of its own, manipulating 
the most immediate environment and creating a reachable and graspable 
habitat.  
Roughly, we might draw the distinction between the movement that 
intends to cover distance and the movement that “ﬁxes” what has been 
attained by these other movements. The ﬁrst kind deals with the consti-
tution of space, the latter constitutes a place for the body to rest. In rest, 
the body may lie, or stand, or sit, or cuddle, or lean, or hang, or be in a 
number of statically justiﬁable positions. In motion, the body is directed 
toward something by moving itself or by moving what is about and around 
it. The normal body’s reach is not unlike the one depicted in Leonardo da 
Vinci’s famous drawings of the body and its proportions. This is the nor-
mal body able to create a tree of projections and actions around it. Next 
to the painting of Leonardo’s human body, the Contergan person is visibly 
deformed. His arms are cut at the shoulders and his legs are shortened. If 
put in Leonardo’s drawing, his tree of projections will be more of a desert 
brush, dried up and crooked.
As you can see, the options outlined for the normal body are not 
available for the abnormal body. More concretely, the Contergan woman 
that I saw at the exhibit had no arms; only a short right-shoulder stub. Her 
feet were deformed at the ankles preventing her from long-distance, if any 
distance, movements. At the same time, her toes had an unusually high 
level of dexterity that allowed her to use them for reaching, grabbing, and 
holding, as well as manipulating held objects. Yet, if not for the electrical 
chair, she would not have been mobile; the chair was not just a needful 
thing but a place that held her, suspended her body in a sitting position of 
a normal body. But sitting her body was not, moving in the chair freely as 
a child would in the adult size arms chair (we should not forget that the 
Contergan torso is dwarfed). In addition to the shoulder stub, she also used 
her toes to move the machine and herself in it. At best, she was slouching 
upwards, half sitting, half-lying. In this skewed conﬁguration, the range of 
her outward movements and motions was limited but not devoid of preci-
sion and grace.
Despite its radical diﬀerence, however, the Contergan body does not 
exist outside of the relationship with the normal body, whether it is a relative, 
hired help, or any other “normal” person. The normal and the abnormal 
co-aﬀect and co-constitute each other as both actual bodies and virtual 
projections. How do they share this space? In the Husserlian account, what 
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relates embodied subjects is empathy which makes “nature an intersubjec-
tive reality and a reality not just for me and my companions of the moment 
but for us and for everyone who can have dealings with us and can come 
to a mutual understanding with us about things and about other people” 
(Husserl, 1940, p. 91). Sameness in the constitution of space and time is 
a given; if an anomaly arises for one body, the other body would ignore it, 
carrying out the task of correcting the anomalous perception. In this set-up, 
the abnormal body of the other will remain abnormal unless the community, 
together with its source, accepts the abnormal way of constituting the world 
as optimal and thus normalizes the formerly abnormal perception.  
If, however, the normal and the abnormal meet as radically diﬀerent 
species, as a socially accepted fact, their co-aﬀective constitution will not 
result in sameness but simultaneously unraveling diﬀerences. The projection 
onto the free space will bring about rupturing disjointedness, albeit given 
in abstraction. Since all the bodies are free to access, that is, constitute the 
free space, the interaction between the bodies is inevitable. The other’s body, 
whether normal or abnormal, serves as a completion of a social system, but 
also introduces constitutive possibilities as to the world itself.  Merleau-Ponty 
(1962) explains: “This disclosure of the living body extends to the whole 
sensible world, and our gaze, prompted by the experience of our body, will 
discover in all other ‘objects’ the miracle of expression” (p. 197).  
The body conﬁrms and elaborates the pre-existent world. Due to its 
freedom to accomplish human history, the body ceases to be a mere frag-
ment of the world, and turns it into a theatre, a remarkable prolongation 
of its own dealings. Merleau-Ponty (1962) writes, “Insofar as I have sensory 
functions, I am already in communication with others taken as similar 
psycho-physical subjects” (p. 352). The co-aﬀective constitution of the 
world endows the abnormal body with the freedom that extends beyond 
a momentary disruption of the normality, turns it into a productive force 
capable of projecting the kind of meaning that can only be described as 
artistic.11 “The body,” writes Merleau-Ponty, “is to be compared not to 
a physical object but rather to a work of art” (ibid., p. 150). This insight 
echoes certain Husserlian considerations introduced in Ideas I. Husserl’s 
insights link art to abnormal perception. For Husserl (1931), a painting 
is given as a quasi-being, or “neither as being nor as non-being” (p. 287). 
Husserl explores artistic givenness as a neutrality modiﬁcation of perception, 
meaning a partial suspension of normal perception of the world. The reduc-
tion is partial because of the body that can never apprehend the painting 
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fully. But, even in its partial function, neutrality modiﬁcation lifts the veil 
of the everyday, implicating the body. Husserl calls this kind of perception 
“fancy consciousness.” In other words, a leap of imagination is required to 
achieve the act of suspension. A combination of imagination and straight 
perception makes fancy consciousness a synthetic consciousness capable of 
fulﬁlling several acts simultaneously.  
At this point, we must persist, But how? Husserl remains ambiguous on 
this issue. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of style might help us with an answer. For 
him, style is a unity of tactile and visual percepts. Style is intrinsic not only 
to bodies but also to artistic expressions: “A novel, poem, picture or musical 
work are individuals, that is, beings in which the expression is indistinguish-
able from the thing expressed, their meaning, accessible only through direct 
contact” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 52). It is in this sense that our body is a 
work of art. In the same sense, the work of art has a body. Merleau-Ponty 
calls a painting a nexus of living meanings that speaks the primordial silence.
It is from this silence that a subjectively oriented style arises. Visually, the 
silence is given as depth. Yet, the depth itself is not reachable by any visual 
means. It does not belong to the painting. Likewise, it does not belong to 
the body. But it does belong to the world. We understand art “only if we 
place, at the center of the spectacle, our collusion with the world” (ibid., p. 
429). The abnormal body gives away its speciﬁc unreplicable style. Its style 
emerges from the silence of the inassimilable alienness. Let us return to the 
description of the Contergan body. 
She moved as if she was not assembled properly, as if her body parts 
were disjointed at the points that put the whole frame of her body in ques-
tion.  She was a collage made of odd objects; her arm stub and her twisted 
legs looked as if they came oﬀ from a non-human creature. Her stately head, 
much larger than her body, had a solemn expression giving her a distinctly 
nonaligned look. Her body, small and fragile, half a body, appeared to be 
torn apart by some mechanical mangler of ﬂesh. This strange assimilation of 
incompatible parts made her movements as bizarre and as majestic as if she 
was a royalty raised from some underground dream-world, invading one’s 
peace and usurping it, leaving us with nothing but emptiness in the wake 
of explosive astonishment and awe. In a helplessly powerful way, she took 
away our so-called reality, making us realize that it does not really belong to 
us, that reality we are used to call home. The alienness of her style awakened 
a being that could not be incorporated in the dynamic duration of normal-
izing. This style came into a remarkable constitutive relationship with the 
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style of the normal body. The interaction between the two suspended the 
normal, giving birth to the uncanny. It is time to ask ourselves, What does 
it mean for the abnormal body to be given as uncanny? What does the uncanny 
body express? In answering these questions, we are facing a dilemma. On 
the one hand, we can hardly escape the Freudian pull: after all, “uncanny” 
was an inalienable theme in his conceptualization of the unconscious from 
the very beginning. On the other hand, albeit a Freudian derivative, the 
uncanny became the foundation of the surrealist movement. The role of the 
uncanny for the surrealist anesthetization of the abnormal body is diﬃcult 
to underestimate. It is for that reason that I ﬁnd it necessary to give the key 
surrealist concepts an elaboration.
The Uncanny Body of Surrealismus
The major tenets of surrealism were summed up by the end of its matu-
ration in 1936 by Andre Breton who delivered the last surrealist Manifesto 
in Brussels to an audience associated with the movement. There, Breton 
(1936) conﬁrmed the ongoing voyage of the surrealist “thought” as “it came 
normally to Marx from Hegel, just as it came normally to Hegel through 
Berkeley and Hume” (p. 3). The allusion to philosophy was not made in jest; 
it indicated an intellectual tradition linked to the history of humankind. The 
thought erupted in surrealism through expressive action, instantly gaining 
into “a living moment, that is, to say a movement undergoing a constant 
process of becoming” (ibid., p. 4). The key principle of surrealism, as Ap-
pollinaire called this idea in action, was to seek after new values in order 
to conﬁrm or invalidate existing ones. Unlike the precursor of surrealism, 
Dada, the surrealists did not seek to destruct or shock. The search for the 
new values should result in bringing about “the state where the distinction 
between the subjective and the objective loses its necessity and value” (ibid., 
p. 13). Reverberations onto the phenomenological view of the social world 
raise clear in the ﬁrst deﬁnition of surrealism as “pure psychic automatism” 
(ibid., p. 7). In order to reach this state, one needed to perform a kind of 
reduction that placed the surrealist outside all aesthetic or moral preoccupa-
tions in the collective subconscious of a Freudian kind.  
The combination of dream and reality was what deﬁned surrealism 
primarily. The surrealists were also keen on psychologizing chance; their 
ways of doing so included the technique of “anticipatory chance-making” 
when an artist would create by the means of chance, e.g., abrupt disruption 
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of the artistic activity.12 In opposition to the bankrupt values of the petite 
bourgeois that feared everything that is wondrous, surrealism oﬀered the 
rediscovery of the wonder in the abnormal in the sense of the most surreal. 
At the same time, this very surreality should never leave reality; it should 
“reside in reality itself and will be neither superior nor exterior to it. Ac-
cording to Breton (1936), “The marvelous is always beautiful, anything 
marvelous is beautiful; indeed, nothing but the marvelous is beautiful” 
(p. 9). The search for the beautiful involved initially incompatible objects, 
states, and events. Taken outside of their respective nexuses of meaningful-
ness and recombined in new states, meant to explode the solid mundane go 
of the world, on the one hand, and create an insight into the world before 
the socialized formulae.  
Breton identiﬁes three periods for surrealism. The initial, “intuitive” 
period is fascinated with psychoanalysis, the Freudian uncanny. It was also 
the period that sought to undermine any kind of self-moralizing normality. 
The second period that settled in the early nineteen thirties is characterized 
by the rational drive to turn dreaming into a myth of the dream, bring the 
myth from the recesses of the forgotten memory. The third and the ﬁnal 
period, the one yet to come, for Breton, and the one that was ceased midway 
by the war, dealt with the history, the creation of an inter-generational nar-
rative that would secure the transition from one generation to another. In 
sum, the three periods of surrealism begot, shaped, and brought to sociality 
the uncanny which, in the last instance, could break through the realm of 
transcendence into such manifest forms of representation as painting, pho-
tography, and narrative. The object of these transformations, the abnormal 
body, found its texture, ﬁgure, and enunciation in these three interconnected 
modalities. It would be only too appropriate to begin with the modality of 
the abnormal body’s ﬁrst appearance.
The Surreal Horizon of Max Ernst
In the description of my experience, I mentioned that the Contergan 
woman was situated next to Max Ernst’s painting “The Teetering Woman,” 
also known as “Equivocal Woman.”13 Let us examine the painting closely 
(see Figure 3).  In the painting we see a woman whose body is suspended 
above the dark surface. It appears that she is trying to balance herself. How-
ever, it is not quite clear in relation to what she might be trying to achieve 
this balance. Her suspended state is suspect for the normal perception; she 
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is not walking on any surface; nor is 
she leaning against any surface. She 
rather ﬂoats in a relation to the ma-
chine, being somewhat attached to its 
ambiguous mechanics. The machine 
also seems to be suspended. The green 
bars that go down into the darkness of 
the opening between the two columns 
are the only connecting structures; 
and nonetheless they fail to disam-
biguate the purpose of the woman 
and the function of the machine.  As 
the second title for the painting sug-
gest, the woman is equivocal; her only 
purpose is to maintain equilibrium 
at some limit. The woman’s eyes are 
Figure 3. Max Ernst, Teetering Woman, 
1923 
 Figure 4. Max Ernst, Celebes, 1921
hidden behind the pipe that comes out of the machine but does not have 
its quadra-linear geometry. The pipe looks more organic than the woman 
herself, who, in her brownish, machine-matching color scheme looks dead, 
doll-like. The hair on the woman’s head suggests that the body was inverted 
back to the upright posture from the original upside down position. The 
background of the painting is reminiscent of Chirico’s landscapes: industrial 
columns, indeﬁnite perspective, and 
an incidental object that gives the ar-
rangement of ﬁgures in the painting 
a unity of focus. Yet, the depth of the 
appearance is compromised, broken. 
How shall we interpret such a painting 
in relation to our topic?  
First, we can say that the paint-
ing gives the encounter with the lived 
abnormal body of the Contergan 
woman a context by way of horizon. 
Uniquely, the woman blends into the 
painting as it—the painting—creates 
a sense of indiﬀerent dehumanizing 
environment, an environment, where 
the human body is dulled, robbed of 
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motion and sight, suspended to meet its own dream as it walks without 
walking to gain a place it cannot by deﬁnition reach. The painting is a clas-
sical, for the early twentieth century, critique of technology that assists the 
person by delivering the person to sleep in a place where the sleeper walks 
erect, as if in the waken state. Her dream is a psychoanalytic dream of the 
broken memory, a history interrupted by its own deception. The woman 
blends with the machine, dependent but unaware of her dependence, just 
like the Contergan person, a product of the technological panacea mixed on 
the desire for a relief from being. She is also one with the machine in a phe-
nomenological way as it is the machine that co-constitutes her movements. 
It suspends her by providing the ground upon the ground we share. 
The painting’s history testiﬁes to its signiﬁcance. Ernst did it in 1923 
breaking a long stride of collage making. After many years of experimenting 
with collages, Ernst came to the realization that collage often lacks in the abil-
ity of creating a meaningful interface between diﬀerent originally unrelated 
components. His new idea required a synthetic medium, a medium that 
would create a uniﬁed impression. But some of the collages that immediately 
preceded the painting alert us to the possibility that the main constituents of 
the image were a female acrobat, a sleepwalker, and a machine for spreading 
oil on water. Ernst combined the acrobat and the sleepwalker in one image 
while “freezing” the oil coming out of the machine. The images were cut 
out from the medical, popular, and technical journals. The precursor to the 
teetering woman is the mechanical monster, “Celebes” (see Figure 6).14 The 
elephantine meat grinder machine is in fact a reproduction of a photograph 
of a Sudanese corn holder. It was common for Ernst to re-use ready-mades, 
adding or deleting certain fragments so that the new reality would spell a 
diﬀerent, often sinister, world. There is also the German rhyme that is as-
sociated with the painting: “The elephant from Celebes has sticky, yellow 
bottom grease…” By positioning the female torso in the front ground of the 
painting, Ernst indicates that she might be the end product of the machine’s 
workings: creating sublime dreams of beauty and horror. 
As much as Ernst himself was teetering on the edge of abnormal and 
absurd, the abnormal body of the Contergan person was teetering on the 
edge of the surreal; beautiful as only surreal dreams could be beautiful. The 
context of the encounter between the two-dimensional art and the abnor-
mal body that spawned the experience of the surreal was serendipitous. But 
was it really unique? Would such a transformation be possible without the ﬂat 
horizontality of a self-imposed aesthetic background? Can the abnormal body 
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be art for the experience of the visual aesthetics?  For the answer I suggest that 
we turn to Joel-Peter Witkin, a contemporary American photographer, who 
seeks and ﬁnds beauty within the grotesque spectacles of humanity: dwarfs, 
hermaphrodites, amputees, carcasses, and “any living myth” in the words 
of Witkin himself. The experience of his work is saturated with the dense 
emotional complexity and tension. For Witkin, this experience is precisely 
surreal. Early in his career, when he just began to look for beauty in the 
horriﬁc sublime, Witkin turned to Chirico and Dali for inspiration. “We 
try to control chance, make it formula, but to be actually overwhelmed by 
the wonder and the beauty is quite another thing. Poetics and surrealism 
does not exist within that kind of parameters of association” (Witkin, 1990, 
p. 3). In one of the interviews, Witkin describes his work as a hysterical 
process of collage-making and cites Ernst as his inspiration that taught him 
how to combine paper cuttings with photographs to create a subverted 
pictorial space for the real. Except that in Witkin’s art, the real people are 
the cutouts.  
Exemplar I: Surreal Figure
Witkin’s indebtedness to Ernst is evident in the production of richly 
textured, highly manipulated prints which betray the surrealist style. Meeting 
with macabre experiences as a child and developing an empathetic response 
to them gave him an eye on the abnormal, a see-through that embraced 
both the human materials and the non-human material. The mangled 
forms orchestrated into familiar motifs draw on history, religion, and clas-
sical aesthetic forms. It is told that after seeing a 19th-century ambrotype of 
woman and her ex-lover (who had been crudely scratched from the frame), 
Witkin challenged the sanctity of the untouched photograph and began 
the years of experimentation which characterize his contemporary work. 
He employs a highly intuitive approach to the physical process of making 
the photograph, including scratching the negative, bleaching or toning the 
print, and an actual hands-in-the-chemicals printing technique.15 The end 
result is a challenge to the bourgeois principles of artistic beauty. For the 
overriding principle of aesthetic abnormality, Witkin poses suﬀering, the 
ultimate human condition. Contrary to some critical voices, the portrayal 
of grotesque abnormality does not seek to shock. Nor does it intend to 
reinstitute abnormality as an alternative to normal corporeality. Rather, it 
seeks to pose abnormality beyond the discussion about the normal/abnor-
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mal in the sphere of surreal. Below I would like to present an example that 
derives from that sphere.
Figure 6. Paul Rubens, Satyr, 1615, 
Satyr with Maid and Fruit Basket 
Figure 5. Joel-Peter Witkin, 1992,   Satiro
In the 1990 photograph 
called “Satiro” Witkin bedazzles 
the viewer with an uncanny crea-
ture (see Figure 5). The creature 
is a man without arms but with 
colossal legs of a goat, or horse, 
just like any other Satyr. A mytho-
logical demi-God, or forest God, 
Satyr is a creature as mischievous 
as it is powerful. He keeps com-
pany with Nymphs, bestowing the 
art of seduction on both men and 
animals. Satyr’s massive legs allow 
him to overcome galloping horses, 
while the mighty arms give him 
audacity to struggle with Hercules himself. 
Rubens’ Satyr would be that paradigmatic 
self who, ﬁlled with darker powers, enjoys 
having them out unleashed (see Figure 6). 
Unlike its prototype, Witkin’s “Satiro” 
is of a diﬀerent kind. His armless body 
is strapped, crossed by leather bands in 
the style of Ancient roman depictions. 
Uncharacteristically for Witkin’s mostly 
studio arrangements, Satiro sits outside 
in the open next to a tree. His company 
is a dog, the guide to the kingdom of the 
dead. The expression on the face of Satiro 
is strangely divergent from the expected 
gleefulness of the forest God. An anecdote 
is associated with this image. The man in 
the photograph is a Mexican actor who 
plays shamans in Spanish conquistador ﬁlms. In order to convince the 
man to pose for him, Witkin had to go all the way to Mexico City. After 
several days of negotiating, Witkin bought two crowns of thorns and ar-
ranged for a site, a pasture in the Mexican countryside. The local shepherd 
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was paid to leave his herd and his dog, and the stump man was seated next 
to a tree. “And my expression?,” asked the actor. “Imagine that you are a 
god who wants to look human,” Witkin instructed.16 This disclosure of the 
daemonic withdrawing into itself is what Satiro is about: the living myth, a 
creature so alien that it creates its own context, fuses it in the act of indigent 
intentionality. And, at the same time, there is familiarity in the image: that 
introspective pensive pause is the opening that lets the creature become a 
part of my perceivable world.
One can imagine now how the Contergan woman can and indeed 
becomes the other of the real, a mythical creature of the world that is yet 
to show itself. No longer adumbrated by the horizonality of the other, she 
forms a horizon by her own ﬁguration, a grand and irreducible presence. 
Her deformity ceases to be a lack; it rather projects a surplus whose density 
and texture is inaccessible to a normal vision of otherness. She arises with 
the context of its own, a mythical creature whose movements separately 
and with the machine form an aesthetic alterity that calls to itself, makes us 
wonder. Unlike Ernst’s “Teetering Woman,” or Witkin’s “Satiro,” however, 
she is surreal not because she is made to be so, but because an encounter 
with her makes her so. I still remember the sense of a loss that I experienced 
at the site of her moving away, leaving the stage of my world, taking away 
the dreams and the myths with her.  I remember with what certainty I knew 
that I would never see her again, wishing she would not go, leaving me but 
with a sense of nostalgia, wishing I could talk to her, ask her for her name. 
This desire to keep wonder from dissipating moves us to engage narrative 
memory as what saturates our ordinary lives, in the absence of the surreal, 
with the extras of dream and myth, fantasy and fancy, daemonic and divine. 
And so, in the next section, I would like to address the last encounter with 
the surreal, in and by narrative. 
Exemplar II: Narrative Surreality
In the second exemplar for this essay, I suggest that we turn to Don 
DeLillo’s The Body Artist. In the novella, the leading character, Lauren Hartke, 
a performance artist by vocation, ﬁrst loses her husband, Rey Robles, a 
controversial ﬁlm director and then meets a strange man in the attic of an 
East coast summer rental, the last place where she and her husband lived. 
The shock caused by her husband’s act and the inability to cope with it open 
Lauren up to an experience that deﬁes customary understanding. At ﬁrst, 
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Lauren feels as if she is going mad, losing her ground. Her body is becoming 
more and more estranged from herself as she begins to experience involuntary 
tremors and shakes, near faints and disorientations, as in “small helpless sink-
ing toward the ground, a kind of forgetting how to stand” (DeLillo, 2001, 
p. 33). The emphasis is on forgetting, forgetfulness of one’s body, the very 
body that does things, which her friend has seen only in animations. It has 
never been against her, her body: “I’ve always felt smart in my body […] 
It absorbs me in a disinterested way. I try to analyze and redesign” (ibid., 
p. 105). DeLillo describes Hartke’s ability of entering the bodies of adoles-
cents, Pentecostal preachers, and bulimic teenagers and a pregnant man as 
emptying. For the metaphor of emptying DeLillo oﬀers an empty road that 
Hartke watches over and over again on the Internet in real time. The road 
is in Finland, in the village of Kotka. A ﬁxed over-head camera shows the 
road twenty-four hours a day: an occasional car passes by ﬁlling it, then it 
is night and emptiness again: “Kotka was another world but she could see 
it in its realness, in its hours, minutes, and seconds” (ibid., p. 38).
The ability of emptying herself, this gift, goes beyond empathy; it shows 
the possibility of achieving the abnormal normality of the other, albeit for 
aesthetic purposes: Hartke does not strive to assume the other’s identity, just 
get to the root of it. She becomes the other in her body, and it is her body 
that narrates the experience of the other’s body through the other. “Always 
in the process of becoming another,” she sheds oﬀ her sense of the body and 
impresses the other’s motor sensory self upon the body of hers (DeLillo, 
2001, p. 105). This is what makes Hartke a body artist par excellence. She 
is sculptor of others, and, in her narrating those experiences, herself. This 
inter-corporeal faculty creates an interweaving of matter, and not just for 
the viewer, but for the artist as well: She is in art. She is above art. She is 
in truth. The juxtaposition between the two, art and truth, or shall we say, 
descending into truth is at the very border of surreal. And so is she a surreal 
artist. A liminal ﬁgure, Lauren is out and above the normal ﬂow of time. 
She is in it all right, but, in an elevated sense, hovering. Being this, abnormal 
at the aesthetic limit, Lauren encounters a surreal experience that makes 
her body-art possible. Shortly after, almost immediately after her husband’s 
death, Lauren discovers a strange man in the attic of the summer rental. A 
strange man walks into her suspended reality and transforms it according 
to his own, astonishingly deformed, rules of space-time constitution. That 
is when Lauren is guided over the limit to experience time as moment. Not 
the kind of a moment that passes and you catch it on the way to another 
   
  
                                  Alexander Kozin   481
moment. No, it is the kind of time that is “simply and overwhelmingly 
there, laid out, unoccurring” (ibid., p. 77). The little man who Lauren meets 
embodies the time of stills.
He narrates this time in broken, slow, repetitive speech that exhibits a 
ﬂow that doesn’t know the diﬀerence between “now” and “then,” or “here” 
and “there.” Apparently retarded to a normal person, he is a contortionist 
of the normal world to Lauren, a creature who shows the world in sur-. 
His enigmatic apparition and his as mysterious appearance create a time-
less double. He is thin, fragile, “it was hard to think him into being, even 
momentarily, in the shallowest sort of conjecture, a ﬁgure by the window 
in the dusty light” (DeLillo, 2001, p. 60). Mr. Tuttle, a name given the 
creature by Lauren, spoke in many voices, in the voice of Lauren’s husband, 
most importantly. He let her relive the last moments of the ordinary and 
the normal that now, animated by the extra-ordinary, made out into the 
world, still elusive, but alive. His ﬁgure, a half-broken semblance of man, cut 
an opening in time, made it stay still. It took many levels of perception to 
recognize what he was saying, many generations and social histories. When 
Lauren learnt the way, she took to the extremes of her own normality, and 
it is only by reﬂecting, analyzing, and designing her body in the face of the 
extraordinary banality of the everyday that she managed to hold onto the 
experience of the surreal. But even that will soon be gone leaving nothing 
but Hartke’s performance in its wake. The encounter with the abnormal 
in the aesthetic context touches upon the surreal, but does not let us dwell 
there. It rather leaves us with the remainder held by the fusion of the experi-
ences. I tried to express the lingering experience of this relation in this study. 
Hartke does it in her performance. The repetitions of her husband’s voice 
overheard by the stranger gives it a body, a surreal expression that translates 
into the surreal body art in extremis: “Her art emerges as obscure, slow, 
diﬃcult and sometimes agonizing. Silently, it twists and shapes the body 
into a primordial drama. But it is never the grand agony of stately images 
and sets. It is about you and me. It is about who we are when we are not 
rehearsing who we are” (ibid., 109-110).   
Postcript
The abnormal body stands out. It makes an impression. The impression 
may last or fade away as soon as the body leaves the ﬁeld of one’s perception. 
If it lingers, it creates the sense of something extra, something out-worldly. 
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In this essay, I attempted an examination of this extra as it was given to me 
in a most personal way, through the encounter with the abnormal body of 
the Contergan person. Given with and against the surrealist background, 
the Contergan woman did not just leave a long-lasting impression; she also 
suggested the surrealist foundation for this experience. Trying to under-
stand this experience made me turn to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, whose 
phenomenological investigations of the body and art provided a frame for 
comprehending how the limit formed by the abnormal sphere could possibly 
coincide with the boundaries set by the artistic intentionality and how the 
body of the Contergan person and the body of the surreal image merged 
toward an aesthetic whole. As my own experience unfolded in narration 
and imagery, I was led to Joel-Peter Witkin’s “Satiro” and Don DeLillo’s 
“Body Artist.” A close reading of those exemplars showed that uncanny 
abnormality could also be revealed as symbolic and narrative surreality. The 
former creates a still that penetrates the sphere of the normal, holding it at 
the limit. The latter prolongs the crossing by giving it voice. Together, they 
create an extra to the otherwise normal world. 
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Notes
1 After the drug was taken oﬀ the market, in 1971, a class malpractice suit against Gruenthal 
AG was brought up in the civil court.  At the end of the trial, the 2.5 thousand plaintiﬀs 
won over 26 million D-marks in lifetime pensions.
2 The term used to describe this facility is “mimetism.”
3 Here and elsewhere I use the term “other” to designate both the Other as person and the other 
as otherness more generally. The reason for such merger is implicated in the essay’s argument: 
the experience of the Contergan person allows for the experience of both dimensions. 
4 In her examination of empathy, Depraz (2001) names four diﬀerent stages that provide for 
the empathetic link on the level of the body. Among them, there are “a passive association 
of my lived body with your lived body and an imaginative self-transposal in your psychic 
states” (p. 172). 
5 Husserl (1940, p. 315). Also, see Bernet (1998). In examining Levinas’s claim of self-ab-
negation vis-a-vis Merleau-Ponty, Bernet agrees with the latter who poses the skin as the 
limit to the Other’s claim.
6 For an in-depth analysis of the monstrous sublime, see Kearney (2003).
7 Levin (1999) emphasizes this very feature as crucial for the understanding of the perceived 
perception: “the chiasmic dynamics of the ﬂesh suggest that certain reversibility take place 
in the perceptual ﬁeld” (p. 84). This means, paraphrasing Merleau-Ponty, that one may not 
know if he perceives or is perceived. At the same time, the perceiver’s body is always hers, 
although it may not be known as such.
8 In his argument for the ambiguity of the body Gallagher suggests that “[body] appears 
as an ability or as an available potential to interact intentionally with the world” (1986, p. 
143). In other words, between the present and the non-present body, there is a space of being 
connected to other bodies, in ﬂesh. Most importantly, the latter faculty is not a function of 
the body itself but rather a contextual feature, a call of the world, as it were.
9 Following Behnke (2004), it might be more correct to speak about Husserl’s program be-
ing indicative rather than expository of inter-corporeality; yet, given the phenomenological 
ground of Husserl’s indication, it can as well as be taken for a guiding clue into inter-cor-
poreality.
10 For further elaborations on the home/alien structure, see Waldenfels (1996) and Steinbock 
(1995). 
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11 The possibility for the artistic meaning to shine through the eye-to-eye encounter is also 
consistent with the Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility thesis. According to Dillon, seeing and be-
ing seen is an asymmetrical event that develops within visibility (p. 304). The importance 
of seeing or being seen “as” is predicated on the function of the background or horizon. In 
the case of a painting, the horizon becomes a ﬁgure, hence the possibility of what is being 
seen to be being seen “as.”
12 In great detail, Dali (1932) describes this process of painting “unnaturally:” sudden seizures 
in front of the easel, “accidental” misapplications of colors, leaving sub-tasks unﬁnished, 
etc. 
13 The paining is housed in Kunstsammlung Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf, Germany.
14 The painting is housed in the Tate Modern, London, UK.
15 From the 1989 interview.
16 From the 1989 interview.
Author’s note: Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Alexander Kozin 
at Freie Universität Berlin. Email: alex.kozin@gmx.net. 
